Recently, Amin and Biswas proposed a novel authentication protocol for TMIS. They claimed that their protocol provides security protection on the attacks proposed by them. Even though Amin and Biswas's protocol achieves efficiency, we demonstrate that their protocol is insecure against many attacks. To overcome the defects in Amin and Biswas's protocol, we proposed an improved user authentication scheme in TMIS. The security analysis shows that the proposed protocol remedies the weaknesses in Amin and Biswas's protocol.
Introduction
As a viable solution to the continuously rising demand in medical and healthcare services, TMIS employs information and communication technologies to provide remote services that assists with certain healthcare activities. TMIS establishes a secure communication platform between the patients at home and doctors through public networks.
Because of the important properties of biometrics [1] , it is desirable to combine smart card with biometric to design more secure authentication schemes for TMIS [2] . In 2015, Amin and Biswas proposed a novel authentication scheme for multi-medical server in TMIS [3] . Unfortunately, we demonstrate that Amin and Biswas's protocol will be compromised under user impersonation attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, replay attacks, privilege insider attacks, and fails to achieve forward secrecy. To eliminate the shortcomings in Amin et al.'s protocol [3] , we proposed an improved user authentication scheme for TMIS, which withstands many well-known traditional attacks.
Review of Amin and Biswas's scheme
In this section, we mainly review medical server registration phase, user registration phase, login phase, authentication and key agreement phase of Amin and Biswas's scheme. Amin and Biswas quote bio hashing ( ) H  to resolve high false rejection [4] . Compared with modular exponentiation and elliptic curve point multiplication, bio hashing is more efficient [5] . 
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Off-line password guessing attacks
The attacker first obtains the information ), 
, the adversary will be detected by j MS .
Server spoofing attacks
To masquerade as a remote medical server j MS , an adversary has to transmit a valid message 
Replay attacks
In our protocol, because the information ij G contains fresh timestamp 
Privileged insider attacks
In the registration phase, a user will deliver encapsulated identity )) (
and i r is unknown, such a process can prevent a privileged insider from acquiring user's identity and password.
Performance comparisons
In order to evaluate the security performance of our scheme, we compare the two related schemes [8, 3] with our scheme in Table 1 . The efficiency comparison in terms of computational overhead among the related schemes and our proposed scheme is shown in Table 2 . For convenience, h T and m T denote the time complexity of hash operation and modular multiplication operation, respectively. As shown in Table 1 , we can see that Lu et al.'s scheme and Amin and Biswas's scheme only withstand two out of six attacks. However, our improved scheme can achieve all the security requirements listed in Table 1 . From Table 2 , we can conclude that our scheme is more efficient than the other two schemes [8, 3] . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed Amin and Biswas's authentication scheme and demonstrated that their scheme does not fulfill their claims as it satisfies all the desirable security attributes. To remedy security flaws, we have proposed a secure biometric-based remote user authentication scheme. The security and performance analysis show that the proposed scheme not only withstands kinds of attacks but also presents efficient login and authentication phase.
